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Abstract: This article focuses on the aesthetics of Wil-
liam Wordsworth’s work, particularly his early poetry. 
The implications of this investigation are far-reaching.1 
To learn about Wordsworth’s aesthetics is to learn about 
Romanticism, specifically what I call radical Romanti-
cism and the intricate relation it forges between aesthetics 
and democracy.2  I begin the article with a general ac-
count of radical aesthetics, addressing its nature, scope, 
and its relation to the normative, the political, and the 
everyday. Next, I turn to the radical aesthetics of Words-
worth.  I then compare radical aesthetics to more tradi-
tional accounts of aesthetics, and I conclude by connect-
ing radical Romantic aesthetics to practical power.  
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Radical Aesthetics 
 
What makes radical aesthetics radical? It is radical in at 
least two, interrelated ways. It is radical insofar as it seeks 
to promote progressive, normative perspectives. And it is 
radical insofar as it is an aesthetics that is broad in scope 
(for example, its subject matter is not limited to the por-
traits of the museum or to the picturesque of the land-
scape). Its normative, progressive sensibilities include 
everyday justice and injustice and its aesthetic sensibili-
ties include everyday experiences. So, the scope of radical 
aesthetics is as likely to pertain to the homeless popula-
tion on the city streets as to the sunset over Mount Blanc. 
In the manner of Wordsworth (as we will soon see) radi-
cal aesthetics embraces the everyday, bringing careful, 
critical attention to what is in plain sight and what is hid-
den or concealed, and all the while offering an appropri-
ate moral, political, and affective response to the social 
and natural quotidian world around us.  
Radical aesthetics, I have claimed, is located in the 
everyday, and therefore it is also situated at the intersec-
tion of those spheres that are often named political and 
moral. In our everyday lives, these spheres usually inter-
mingle in various ways. Radical aesthetics acknowledges 
this dynamic amalgam and does not seek to impose artifi-
cial disciplinary categories that distort our everyday ex-
perience. Art itself is often located in its own category 
separate from the political and the moral. Insofar as this is 
the case, radical aesthetics rejects these imposed boundar-
ies. Additionally, radical aesthetics acknowledges and 
embraces the intricate, transactional relation between the 
social and natural world—between the cultural materiality 
of language, practices, and institutions and the dynamic 
processes of land, sea, and sky. In particular, the art of the 
word can be understood as both a spiritual project en-
gaged with a material universe and as a material project 
engaged with a spiritual universe. But rather than employ 
such binary terms as spiritual-material, think of the art of 
the word—in the context of radical aesthetics—as a pro-
foundly human project engaged normatively with the fa-
miliar and unfamiliar world in which we find ourselves. 
Radical aesthetics seeks to imagine what it would be 
like to taste—to experience morally—the world in novel 
ways, especially in ways that are receptive to seeing and 
hearing and sensing beauty and generosity, pain and in-
justice in the otherwise familiar (perhaps too familiar) 
events, places, practices, traditions, and institutions that 
shape our lives. In order to focus on the everyday, radical 
aesthetics seeks to lift “the veil of familiar”—all those 
patterns of thought, sight, and practice that would render 
invisible and voiceless those creatures, human or non-
human, that lack power or agency to make their needs and 
desires apparent. Radical aesthetics interrogates and il-
luminates how the world appears to us and how it could 
(and should) appear, and focuses on the disjunction be-
tween the two. This critical, creative work requires a tu-
tored moral imagination and the cultivation of an ethically 
penetrating sight, or as I will soon call, a democratic 
taste.  
 The scope of radical aesthetics is as expansive as its 
engagement is deep and demanding. In this article, I ex-
plore how the art of Wordsworth seeks to cultivate an 
ethical, democratic taste that entails our senses, emotions, 
judgment, and intellect. It seeks to nurture within us a 
particular kind of bodily-cognitive response to the every-
day that surrounds us. So, although Wordsworth is de-
ploying a particular form of aesthetics—the art of the 
written word—the intent of his art is to broaden our aes-
thetic response to the world and not only to his art or to 
that of more traditional artistic forms. The appropriate 
aesthetic responses to our everyday experiences require 
much from us in the way of moral, emotional, cognitive, 
and bodily sensitivity and attunement. And the cultivation 
of such “appropriate aesthetic responses” is the work of 
radical aesthetics. 
A robust aesthetic response, I have noted, entails cog-
nition, bodily senses, emotion, and moral judgment or 
discernment. Radical aesthetics seeks to cultivate a fully 
engaged and attuned response to the natural and social 
worlds. Such engagement and attunement move people to 
delight in and decry the world in appropriate ways. There 
is nothing passive about this aesthetic response, though a 
high premium is placed on receptivity—or what Words-
worth called, “wise passivity.” The radical aesthetic re-
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sponse is in part cognitive, because one needs to know 
something about the world to respond appropriately to the 
work of art or slice of life. For example, one needs to 
know something about poverty and farming to be appro-
priately moved –transformed—by Wordsworth’s verse 
about unjust enclosures. But the aesthetic response entails 
more than the cognitive. The response is spiritual insofar 
as “spiritual” suggests that the whole person is called 
upon—that is, the integration of one’s emotional life, 
bodily senses, moral judgment, and cognitive faculties. 
For radical Romantics like Wordsworth, to be moved 
or transformed (however modestly) by a work of art is to 
experience the world differently and also to engage with 
the world differently. Unlike more traditional aesthetics, 
in which the viewer quietly gazes upon the artwork or 
landscape for the sake of disinterested enjoyment (akin to 
“the male gaze”), in radical aesthetics “the viewer” in fact 
becomes an active, normative witness to the world and in 
turn seeks to transform the world, working for political 
change and conditions congenial to a progressive democ-
racy that honors the dignity of persons and seeks to abol-
ish oppressive institutions and hierarchies. Radical aes-
thetics, then, far from separating the viewer from the 
everyday, seeks to fully engage its participants in the 
world around them, and that broad, aesthetic engagement 
includes a wide range of emotional, bodily, intellectual, 
and political responses. 
Later in this article, I will contrast “traditional” to 
“radical” aesthetics. For now, however, it is important to 
underscore that radical aesthetics, unlike traditional aes-
thetics, embraces both “the moral” and “the practical” or 
“the useful.” That is to say, radical aesthetics is unabash-
edly aligned with such normative projects as social jus-
tice. Those are practical projects. Moreover, radical aes-
thetics—unlike more conventional aesthetics—embraces 
“the useful.” For example, rather than encourage the dis-
interested gaze on the picturesque landscape, radical aes-
thetics urges a useful, practical relation to the land: it en-
deavors to reveal the complex interactions among humans 
(including social and economic institutions), non-humans, 
and the ecosystems in which they cohabitate.  
By explicitly acknowledging the moral and practical 
dimensions of aesthetics, radical aesthetics rejects most 
notions of “the disinterested gaze.” The relation between 
aesthetics and “the disinterested gaze” has a long and 
complicated history. Conventional aesthetics has fre-
quently held that the object of art, similar to that of sci-
ence, should be approached with objective disinterest. 
This distanced, contemplative approach was deemed the 
ideal lest the viewer have an unduly subjective or utili-
tarian approach to the work of art. Kant, for example, ar-
gued that we must approach art free of personal motiva-
tion or self-interest, never utilizing art as a means to an 
end. How else are we to see the art for what it is as op-
posed to what we want it to be for our own sake and 
ends? And how else are we to produce impartial, univer-
sal aesthetic judgments, if not by eliminating personal 
preference, desire, and goals? While there are strengths to 
this line of argument (namely, placing a high value on our 
receptiveness to that which is outside us), conventional 
aesthetics has paid dearly in espousing the disinterested 
gaze. By separating art from interest—from involvement, 
concern, desire, commitment, and love—art became di-
vorced from ethics and politics. Of course, many have 
justifiably questioned whether aesthetics could ever in 
fact be disinterested. Feminists, for example, have 
charged that the so-called ideal disinterested viewer is in 
fact the interested male voyeur, gazing on the female 
nude with a sanctioned yet hidden desire. In contrast to 
the ideal of the “disinterested” in conventional aesthetics, 
radical aesthetics promotes an aesthetics of active en-
gagement, attunement, and moral critique.  
 
 
Wordsworthian Radical Aesthetics  
 
Wordsworth believed in the social and political power of 
the well-crafted word.  In a letter written in 1829, Words-
worth wrote, “Words are not a mere vehicle, but they are 
powers either to kill or to animate.”3 This is a powerful 
claim, one that he took seriously. The living power of a 
word can palpably contribute to life or to death. Words-
worth dedicated his poetic aesthetics to life.4 He hoped 
that his radical aesthetics would contribute to the cultiva-
tion of democratic, aesthetic taste, employing the term 
taste in its literal meaning to refer to our capacity to ex-
perience the world normatively. When democratic taste 
has been suitably cultivated, one will see, feel and appre-
hend the drama of life in a distinctive way. One will, for 
example, be empathetic toward those who are crushed by 
social and economic oppression and work for change. The 
characters whom Wordsworth portrayed in his early years 
were often located at the periphery of society—the home-
less, the impoverished, the disabled, the beggar, the 
wounded soldier. He portrayed them vividly so that we 
might see and feel their hopes and fears, their accom-
plishments and losses. We glimpse their humanity and in 
turn discover our own. This is a profound aesthetic and 
democratic achievement: to help citizens experience (to 
taste—to see, feel, hear, and be touched by) the dignity of 
fellow citizens, even those that many deemed to be lowly 
or dangerously “other.” The aim of Wordsworth’s radical 
aesthetics can be summed up as his various poetic efforts 
to make the audience see “souls that appear to have no 
depth at all/To vulgar eyes.”5 
An example of this effort to lend us sight to see the 
depth of “the other” is his 1802 sonnet, "The Banished 
Negroes.”6 In the summer of 1802, Napoleon had reintro-
duced slavery and instituted an ordinance that effectively 
expelled all people of color from France ("aucun noir, 
mulâtre, ou autres gens de couleur, de l'un et de l'autre 
sexe").7 At the end of that summer, William and Dorothy 
Wordsworth traveled from Calais to Dover. A “Fellow-
passenger” on their ship was a black woman who had 
been banished from France.  As the headnote (added to 
the 1827 version of the sonnet) stated, “Among the capri-
cious acts of tyranny that disgraced those times, was the 
chasing of all Negroes from France by decree of the gov-
ernment: we had a Fellow-passenger who was one of the 
expelled.”8  
The sonnet was important to Wordsworth. He returned 
to the poem, pondering and revising it, seven times 
throughout his career (in 1820, 1827, 1836, 1838, 1840, 
1843, and 1845). It was one of his most significant at-
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tempts to present the dignity and humanity of one who, 
for various reasons, is invisible to those with power, privi-
lege, and membership in the majority culture. In this case, 
Wordsworth presented a black woman —a newly dis-
placed refugee— to his fellow travelers. Much of the 
democratic and normative work of the sonnet is done 
within the first three lines: “We had a fellow-Passenger 
that came/From Calais with us…/A negro woman.” Here 
two subjects are placed in a complex relation. On one side 
there is the we —we, William and Dorothy; we, the other 
passengers; we, the white majority culture of the British 
nation; we, the readers of the sonnet. On the other side is 
the solitary black woman. These two sides appear asym-
metrical and perhaps unequal: one black woman up 
against multiple spheres of whiteness. Yet within the son-
net’s first four words, such asymmetry and potential in-
equality are troubled by the mediating term, fellow-
Passenger. Wordsworth places the woman among the we. 
She belongs to us, and we to her. Wordsworth’s inclusion, 
however, has not erased difference. He acknowledges 
both the diversity that the woman embodies as well as her 
status as fellow traveler—as fellow human. This demo-
cratic move is accomplished by the employment of one of 
Wordsworth’s more powerful aesthetic strategies: to re-
veal the unfamiliar in the familiar and the familiar in the 
unfamiliar. In this familiar event, the crossing from Calais 
to Dover, we are given sight to see the unfamiliar—this 
black displaced woman. At the same time, however, 
“careless eyes” are helped to perceive the familiar in this 
unfamiliar event—a fellow human being with depth of 
soul. In the face of her tangible presence, we experience 
both otherness and commonality.  
After several attempts to convey the presence of this 
woman as both a familiar and unfamiliar fellow traveler 
—“like a Lady gay/Yet silent,” “from notice turning not 
away” yet “motionless in eyes and face”—Wordsworth 
concludes the sonnet with explicit social criticism: 
 
She was a Negro Woman driv'n from France 
Rejected like all others of that race, 
Not one of whom may now find footing there; 
What is the meaning of this ordinance? 
Dishonour'd Despots, tell us if you dare.9 
 
When the poem was published in 1802, abolitionists in 
Britain were putting pressure on Parliament to end the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade. That same year, Napoleon had 
reintroduced slavery to Haiti, having captured and im-
prisoned Toussaint L’Ouverture, the former slave and the 
leader of the Haitian independence movement. With "The 
Banished Negroes” (and other sonnets written in 1802), 
Wordsworth allied himself with the abolitionists. His 
headnote and concluding lines express a clear political 
statement. I want to argue, however, that the political and 
democratic work is not done only in these direct state-
ments. Indeed, most of the work is accomplished in the 
sonnet’s earlier lines in which the black woman is pre-
sented. We look into her eyes and her humanity, and we 
witness our own. Through an act of the moral imagina-
tion, we see what was once invisible to us. Our eyes are 
no longer as careless as they once were. We have new 
sight. And to the extent that our recognition of humans 
has grown, so has our humanity.  
Wordsworth’s radical aesthetics, while often moti-
vated by explicit democratic commitments and reasoned 
principles, engages with proper nouns that make claims 
on our lives—particular communities, people, places, and 
things. This is not a sign of anti-intellectualism. But as the 
1790s progressed, Wordsworth became increasingly sus-
picious of the abstract—of things and ideas not rooted in 
the concreteness of time and space. This accounts for his 
eventual frustration with the abstract and impersonal na-
ture of William Godwin’s political philosophy. Godwin 
had argued that people would inevitably become illumi-
nated by the ways of reason, and that the reformer’s job 
was to help that enlightenment along, promoting imper-
sonal truth and justice over private attachments and whim. 
Godwin offered the promised outcomes of the French 
Revolution without its violence. Godwin’s alternative was 
timely and attractive for Wordsworth. Nonetheless, as the 
Prelude movingly documents, Wordsworth’s faith in 
Godwin’s philosophy was short-lived. Godwin’s sanguine 
confidence in abstract reason, his strict impersonalism, 
and perhaps even his atheism, became obstacles to a 
Wordsworth who had put so much stock in the import-
ance of concrete relations among people and place—in “a 
motion and a spirit, that…rolls through all things.”10 
An example of Wordsworth’s expressed doubts about 
abstract “systems” of thought (as compared to concrete, 
aesthetic ones) is found in his 1798 “Essay on Morals”: 
 
 I know no book or system of moral philosophy written with suf-
ficient power to melt into our affections, to incorporate itself 
with the blood and vital juices of our minds…Bald and naked 
reasonings are impotent over our habits; they cannot form them; 
from the same cause they are equally powerless in regulating 
our judgments concerning the value of men and things. They 
contain no picture of human life.11 
 
This passage reveals what Wordsworth took to be the 
purpose and the high stakes of a radical aesthetics. It was 
to be practical. It was to move and change people. It was 
to reach deep into the hearts and minds of citizens and 
produce new habits, new political emotions, new ways of 
being. It was to present a robust “picture of human life.” 
Wordsworth’s suspicion of the abstract suggests not 
only his distance from Godwin but also his proximity to 
Burke. In his 1789 “Letter to Charles-Jean-François De-
pont” Burke wrote, “You have theories enough concern-
ing the rights of men… It is with man in the concrete, it is 
with common human life and human actions you are to be 
concerned.”12  Wordsworth’s complaint about Godwin’s 
abstract rationalism resembled Burke’s critique of the 
French Revolution’s faith in the Temple of Reason. Un-
like Godwin, and like Burke, Wordsworth did not disdain 
the inevitable role of social traditions, habits, practices, 
and institutions. He did not spurn the idea of communities 
and individuals being rooted concretely in time and place. 
Not surprisingly, then, in Wordsworth’s verse and in 
Burke’s prose we find much reference to experience and 
history, to tradition and lived practice. In this regard, 
Wordsworth stood opposed to Godwin and alongside 
Burke. Wordsworth shared with Burke the conviction that 
places inexorably shape communities and their members. 
Unlike Burke, however, Wordsworth also held that the 
reverse is true: that the people shape a place. True, Burke 
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did believe that some of the people, namely the elite, have 
or should have the power to shape and guide their com-
munities. But Burke would not ascribe such agency to the 
common people—to the “unthinking public.”13 In con-
trast, the early Wordsworth believed in and conveyed the 
agency of the people and their capacity to engage wisely 
with their environments.  
In Wordsworth’s poetry, certainly in the Lyrical Bal-
lads and the Prelude, we see attempts to bring together 
Burke’s emphasis on tradition and custom with Godwin’s 
emphasis on reason and principles. Wordsworth was sus-
picious of both reason divorced from experience and ex-
perience detached from reason (critical, reflective 
thought). Like Burke, Wordsworth came to distrust ab-
stract theories that hovered free of history or experience. 
Yet like Godwin, Wordsworth valued critical reflection 
and reasoned principles.  
In the Prelude, for example, Wordsworth mocked the 
idea of reason severed from time and place: 
 
How Glorious!—in self-knowledge and self-rule 
To look through all the frailties of the world, 
And, with a resolute mastery shaking off 
The accidents of nature, time, and place, 
That make up the weak being of the past, 
Build social freedom on its only basis: 
The freedom of the individual mind, 
Which, to the blind restraint of general laws  
Superior, magisterially adopts 
One guide—the light of circumstances, flashed 
Upon an independent intellect.14 
 
This passage, surely taking aim at Godwin’s rationalism, 
lampoons the idea that public well-being and freedom can 
be achieved by means of a rationality detached from ex-
perience—from tradition, history, and local practices and 
conditions (“accidents of nature, time, and place”). Yet, 
wanting to be charitable toward Godwin and others who 
put their hope in “human reason’s naked self,” Words-
worth went on to claim that many have come, for good 
reason, to distrust tradition and practice because of the 
way these have been conceived by conservatives who re-
fuse to reform customs and laws even when circum-
stances (such as unjust practices and policies) clearly dic-
tate that change is needed. He noted that the French Revo-
lution, in spite of its flaws, had nonetheless lifted “a veil” 
and “a shock had then been given/ To old opinions…” 
Yet many, in the name of “ancient institutions,” refused to 
acknowledge what the Revolution had revealed: the sight 
of human suffering and need for change.15 Here Words-
worth was no longer taking aim at Godwin but rather at 
Burke and all other traditionalists who had given “tradi-
tion” and “second nature” a bad name. The challenge for 
Wordsworth, ultimately, was to employ a Burkean lan-
guage of traditions, habits, and virtues in service of a 
Godwinian democratic vision. 
The early Wordsworth understood democracy not only 
as a set of formal political institutions but rather as a pro-
gressive culture or spiritual ethos that included the 
thought, skills, practices, dispositions, and emotions of 
diverse citizens. Wordsworth was committed to advan-
cing an embodied democracy that emphasized the cultural 
dimensions of a democracy, including its religious and 
aesthetic ones. To achieve this goal, he sought to educate 
the whole person, rather than discursively addressing only 
the disembodied mind. 
Wordsworth maintained that progressive political 
principles, such as those of Godwin, require more than 
abstract assent; they require the cultivation of humane 
taste, politically robust emotions, and a truly democratic 
second nature. Wordsworthian radical aesthetics, then, 
should be understood as a powerful way to touch—to 
move, engage, and transform—individuals for the sake of 
social progress. The Romantic poem, in this view, is an 
institution, potentially as powerful as the church, capable 
of shaping and training individuals and communities in 
the ways of justice. The well-crafted poem is the Fourth 
Estate: felicitous power outside official state, clerical, and 
economic forces. The well-crafted poem participates in 
what Ralph Waldo Emerson called “the true romance 
which the world exists to realize…the transformation of 
genius into practical power.”16 
 
 
Radical Aesthetics in Light of Traditional Aesthetics 
 
Radical aesthetics departs in notable ways from what is 
commonly associated with aesthetics. Radical aesthetics 
does not insist on the traditional, Kantian divide between 
aesthetics and ethics. While Kant did argue that the moral 
subject requires suitable training in order to appropriately 
grasp the sublime, thereby suggesting a relation between 
aesthetics and ethics, it is, nevertheless, a one-way rela-
tion. For Kant, aesthetics (the sublime) does not shape the 
moral subject but rather it requires a (certain kind of)  
moral subject. Radical aesthetics, in contrast, maintains 
that art can indeed morally cultivate the subject—even as 
it maintains that the subject’s moral formation contributes 
to the apprehension of art. There is, then, a two-way rela-
tion—a dynamic dialectic—between aesthetics and ethics 
in radical aesthetics.  
This close connection between art and ethics informs 
an account of pleasure that signals another departure from 
more traditional aesthetics. Art and beauty may, as Kant 
would have it, bring pleasure. But in radical aesthetics the 
object of such pleasure is not the unsullied form of beauty 
but rather an affecting, integrated depiction of a poignant 
slice of our social and natural world—for example, an apt, 
moving depiction of a beggar, a mournful mother, or a 
fallow garden. Such skillful artistic depictions wake us 
up, helping us to see more fully and to feel more keenly 
the reality of the social and natural world around us. In 
this process of waking up, of becoming more human and 
humane, we do experience pleasure.  Such aesthetic 
pleasure, however, is a consequence of moral cultivation, 
not “a judgment of beauty.” Radical aesthetics endeavors 
to empower its readers to become witnesses: to attest to 
the pain and injustice in our communities, institutions, 
and lands. Whereas Plato banned the poets from the re-
public, radical aesthetics would enlist the poets and en-
courage aesthetic projects and events for the sake of am-
eliorating the republic. And participation in that work of 
amelioration is a source of pleasure. 
Although radical aesthetics participates in what Emer-
son calls “practical power,” it may still be understood as 
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disinterested, capturing at least in part what Kant had in 
mind in the Critique of Judgment by the term disinterest. 
Radical aesthetics is disinterested insofar as it is, in an 
important sense, non-utilitarian. Art is not manipulated or 
produced for the sake of advancing narrow ends. The art-
ist respects that which is before her by listening to it, by 
treating it with fidelity. Radical aesthetics does not im-
pose. It does not distort, willfully. It seeks to witness 
gracefully and accurately—dare I say, objectively. Even 
that creative Romantic faculty, the imagination, is under-
stood not as projection of fantasy but as a creative lens by 
which to bring clear-eyed attention to such experiences as 
war, famine, displacement, urbanization, over- and under-
employment, water and air pollution, and oppressive po-
litical and religious authorities and institutions. The radi-
cal Romantic imagination exhibits a realism of the every-
day as it engages in social criticism, bringing new (accu-
rate, objective) sight to the social and natural worlds and 
the human approaches to them. Hence while reading Mil-
ton’s Paradise Lost, Wordsworth scrawled in the book’s 
margin: “The real excellence of Imagination consists in 
the capacity of exploring the world really existing.”17 
The “disinterestedness” of radical aesthetics, then, 
seeks to present the world faithfully, and the imagination 
is essential to this creative, prophetic task. It is a creative 
task insofar as perceptive discovery requires the imagina-
tion just as much as skillful creation. Creation requires 
receptivity even as receptivity requires creative attention 
(what Wordsworth calls “wise passiveness”).18 For this 
reason, radical aesthetics does not privilege the distinction 
between fiction and nonfiction, but rather calls our atten-
tion to the contrast between the authentic and the inau-
thentic, or between the honest and the dishonest. And pre-
senting the world faithfully is a prophetic task insofar as 
it palpably brings into relief the normative gap between 
how the world is and how it ought to be. Once one be-
comes a witness and sees the world anew, one then longs 
for the world to become a different place—a place more 
just, less cruel. The term longing is important here, for it 
captures both the cognitive and affective aspects of radi-
cal aesthetics’ prophetic task.19  
The “disinterestedness” of radical aesthetics, then, 
does not entail moral indifference. Radical aesthetics is 
disinterested in narrow utilitarian aims, not critical, life-
enhancing normative ones. Furthermore, it is not en-
grossed with that traditional aesthetic triad: the sublime, 
the beautiful, and the picturesque. This triad frequently 
removes art from the everyday and renders the spectator 
distant and detached—a far cry from the engaged witness. 
It has been customary to think of Wordsworth as the poet 
of the glorious landscape. And indeed, in his verse we 
find some of the most moving, detailed, and powerful de-
scriptions of landscapes ever crafted in the English lan-
guage. But these poetic descriptions neither convey a 
static landscape nor encourage a detached spectator. More 
to the point, however, Wordsworth’s poetry was not prin-
cipally centered on “the natural world” divorced from the 
presence of humans. Wordsworth found most of his inspi-
ration in the life, labor, and struggle of commoners, and 
he presented, for all to see and feel, their worth and dig-
nity. His poetry was above all about people—about peo-
ple and the land, and about people and those public and 
private circumstances that comforted and confronted their 
lives.  
Reading Wordsworth in this fashion, as a democratic 
poet, many not prima facie seem to cohere with what he is 
perhaps most famous for, namely the “spots of time” in 
the Prelude. Wordsworth himself used the expression, 
“spots of time,” only once to refer to events in his child-
hood: “There are in our existence spots of time, / That 
with distinct pre-eminence retain/A renovating virtue, 
whence…our minds/Are nourished and invisibly re-
paired.”20 Commentators, however, commonly employ 
the term to refer to a number of powerful, often revelatory 
incidents in Wordsworth’s past. These incidents —vividly 
described memories —typically entail a solitary or iso-
lated Wordsworth (even if he is in the company of others) 
encountering an evocative landscape (e.g., Snowden). It is 
not clear, however, why “spots of time” cannot apply to 
transformative incidents that entail people and that had 
profound political implications for Wordsworth. Nicholas 
Roe, in fact, comes close to making this move. He inter-
prets as “almost…a spot of time” a scene in the Prelude 
that depicts a powerful political event in Wordsworth’s 
life in Revolutionary France.21 When Wordsworth and 
Beaupuy —his friend and radical political mentor—
encountered on the road “a hunger-bitten girl”:  
 
…and at the sight my friend 
In agitation said, ‘Tis against that 
Which we are fighting’, I with him believed 
Devoutly that a spirit was abroad 
Which would not be withstood, that poverty, 
At least like this, would in a little time 
Be found no more…22 
 
In this spot of time, Wordsworth gained a sudden clarity 
on the goals of the Revolution and his commitment to it. 
The impoverished girl became a palpable symbol of the 
Revolution and all that it stood for, and the symbol 
charged Wordsworth’s life with a profound sense of pur-
pose and meaning. Other such transformative moments 
that entail people and community could be plausibly cited 
as spots of time with compelling, explicit sociopolitical 
import (scenes, for example, from “The Female Vagrant,” 
“The Old Cumberland Beggar,” or “The Ruined Cot-
tage”). All this is to say that radical aesthetics is not pre-
occupied with the distant, sublime, uninhabited landscape. 
Radical aesthetics, in contrast to traditional aesthetics, 
is more closely aligned with the way John Dewey placed 
art at the center of an everyday realism.23 Similarly, when 
Wordsworth offered his revolutionary description of who 
the poet is and what poetry is for, he highlighted the poet 
as a fellow human addressing fellow citizens and employ-
ing their everyday language. And although that language 
was, of course, suitably transformed into poetic form 
(though not “ornately”), Wordsworth maintained that 
there is no fundamental difference between prose and 
verse (still another gesture toward the everyday).  And not 
only was the language of Wordsworth’s poetry “every-
day,” but as we’ve seen, so were the characters, events, 
and places about which he wrote.  In this regard, he revo-
lutionized the scope or range of poetic topics. An urgent 
concern for the everyday was placed at the center of art.  
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My point is that radical aesthetics is often a quotidian aes-
thetics: it emerges from the everyday and it largely re-
mains there. A premium is placed on presenting the ordi-
nary and commonplace in such a way as to move and 
touch citizens for the sake of promoting social justice and 
environmental practice. Ultimately, then, the aesthetics of 
radical Romanticism seeks to participate in “the true ro-
mance of the world,” namely, the transformation of 
genius—the transformation of minds and hearts, of cogni-
tion and affect—into practical power. 
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